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Abstract 
Most case studies of nonviolent action have focussed on prominent instances of open resistance 
to repression, especially successful resistance. Additional insight into the dynamics of 
nonviolent action can be gained by studying cases when resistance has been less widespread, 
less visible or less effective. The value of looking at such cases is illustrated by an examination 
of the toppling of Indonesian President Suharto in 1998 -- a prominent and successful exercise 
of nonviolent action -- and, for comparison, the Indonesian anticommunist massacres from 
1965-1966 and repression in East Timor in the decade from 1975, two cases where nonviolent 
resistance was less visible and less effective. These cases reaffirm the crucial role of political 




There is a considerable literature on the politics of nonviolent action, showing how methods such as 
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leafletting, rallies, vigils, refusals to obey, strikes, boycotts, sit-ins and setting up alternative 
institutions can be used to oppose repression and aggression and to promote social justice.[1] Using 
examples or case studies is a standard part of many writings on nonviolent action, which include, for 
example, examinations of the 1930 salt march led by Gandhi in India,[2] the toppling in 1944 of the 
dictatorship in El Salvador,[3] the intifada of 1987-1993 against Israeli occupation of Palestine,[4] 
and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa.[5] 
There is much to be gained by studying case studies, including an appreciation of the dynamics of 
nonviolent action in practice and the importance of various local factors and circumstances. By 
assessing and comparing a large number of examples, generalisations can be proposed and 
subsequently tested.[6] Dealing with case studies helps overcome the risk of nonviolence theory 
becoming divorced from the realities of action. 
Most of the case studies in the nonviolence literature deal with action that is public and prominent. 
Furthermore, there is an emphasis on cases in which nonviolent action is clearly successful in 
bringing about change. Once a framework for analysing nonviolent action is established, there is a 
tendency to select case studies that fit the expected pattern. Students of nonviolent action may search 
all sorts of instances of political action looking for those events that fit the standard model. As a 
result, other sorts of events, that might provide additional insights or challenges to the standard 
model, may be overlooked. In the examination of particular cases, aspects that do not fit expectations 
may be ignored or downplayed. A typical problem is pulling an example of a particular tactic -- such 
as a boycott -- out of its wider social context and touting it as showing what can be achieved using 
nonviolent action. 
For instance, a favourite example in the nonviolence literature is the collapse of the Kapp Putsch, an 
attempted military takeover in Germany in 1920.[7] The nonviolent resistance, most prominent in 
Berlin, was undoubtedly highly significant. It included a general strike, rallies and refusals to obey, 
down to the detail that bank officials refused to honour cheques written by the coup leaders without 
proper authorisation, with no government official agreeing to sign the cheques. However, seldom 
mentioned in the nonviolence literature is the role of armed workers’ groups in opposing the putsch 
as well as seeking social revolution, and the role of the army, which had stood at the sidelines during 
the right-wing putsch, in smashing the left-wing workers’ opposition, including the ongoing general 
strike in Berlin.[8] 
Studying nonviolent action potentially has several purposes, including: 
an intellectual purpose: gaining knowledge into the origins, operation and impacts of 
nonviolent action;  
a practical purpose: learning how to make nonviolent action more effective;  
an inspirational purpose: motivating people to undertake nonviolent action.  
Often, in practice, these purposes cannot be easily separated.[9] Nevertheless, being aware of these 
different purposes is useful. Nonviolence researchers and activists often search out instances of 
successful nonviolent action partly because of their inspirational value. Studying nonviolent actions 
that failed or cases where there was little visible action has less potential to provide inspiration. Yet 
potentially there is much to learn, both intellectually and practically, through examining such 
instances. 
Our aim in this paper is to demonstrate the value of studying cases where nonviolent action is less 
prominent or less effective, as a means for learning about the dynamics of nonviolent action. We do 
this by examining the role of political jiu-jitsu in both high and low-profile resistance to repression. 
Our general case study is the repressive Indonesian regime under Suharto, 1965-1998. We begin by 
summarising the events that led to Suharto’s resignation in 1998, a case study in prominent and 
fairly successful nonviolent action. This case study is of interest in itself and lays the ground for a 
Page 2 of 16Political Jiu-Jitsu Against Indonesian Repression: Studying Lower Profile Nonviolent ...
5/16/2006http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/01pr.html
comparison with two episodes characterised by less visible and less effective nonviolent action 
against Indonesian repression: the 1965-1966 massacres and the 1975 invasion and occupation of 
East Timor. 
Out of the many ideas and important contributions to nonviolence theory,[10] we have chosen to 
focus on the concept of political jiu-jitsu. Richard Gregg in his classic book The Power of 
Nonviolence introduced the idea of ‘moral jiu-jitsu’ as a mode of operation of nonviolent resistance.
[11] Gregg said that when a person uses physical violence against another individual, to respond 
with violence is to tacitly agree that violence is an appropriate means of action. A refusal to use 
violence causes the attacker to lose moral balance, rather like jiu-jitsu causes an attacker to lose 
physical balance. The presence of onlookers can increase the potency of this effect. Gregg uses the 
example of strikers who, if they initiate any violence, lose public sympathy. According to Gregg, 
‘Violence which is not opposed by violence, but by courageous nonviolence, if it is in the open, is 
sure sooner or later to react against the attacker.’[12] 
Gene Sharp revised Gregg’s concept of moral jiu-jitsu and adopted the expression ‘political jiu-jitsu’
to move the focus beyond psychological dimensions. Sharp is widely acknowledged as the world’s 
leading nonviolence researcher.[13] His contributions include a classification of types of nonviolent 
action, enumeration of hundreds of methods of nonviolent action, collection of a vast amount of 
illustrative case material, development of the consent theory of power to underpin an analysis of 
nonviolent action, and an exposition of the dynamics of nonviolent action. 
In Sharp’s framework, political jiu-jitsu is a key factor in the dynamics of nonviolent action, namely 
how nonviolent action works. Sharp presents several components: laying the groundwork for 
nonviolent action; making challenges, which usually brings on repression; building solidarity and 
discipline to oppose repression; building support through political jiu-jitsu; achieving success by 
conversion, accommodation or nonviolent coercion; and redistributing power.[14] Sharp describes 
political jiu-jitsu as follows:  
Political jiu-jitsu is one of the special processes by which nonviolent action deals with 
violent repression. By combining nonviolent discipline with solidarity and persistence in 
struggle, the nonviolent actionists cause the violence of the opponent’s repression to be 
exposed in the worst possible light. This, in turn, may lead to shifts in opinion and then 
to shifts in power relationships favorable to the nonviolent group. These shifts result 
from withdrawal of support for the opponent and the grant of support to the nonviolent 
actionists.[15] 
In essence, political jiu-jitsu uses the opponent’s violence to build greater support. For this to work, 
nonviolent activists must take enough action to significantly challenge the opponent and then be able 
to maintain nonviolent discipline in the face of repression. If the resisters use violence, then 
repression is more easily justified and it becomes much more difficult to mobilise support. 
According to Sharp, three types of groups can be affected by political jiu-jitsu. The first is 
uncommitted third parties. For example, in the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, South African police fired 
into a large crowd of nonviolent protesters without warning, causing many deaths, after some of 
them began throwing stones. This disproportionate response generated outrage internationally and 
was a major setback for the South African apartheid regime. The second type of group is the 
opponent’s own camp. For example, adherence to nonviolence in struggles led by Gandhi against 
British colonial rule in India led to considerable dissent within Britain itself. In contrast, brutal 
British colonial policies against the more violent Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya generated relatively 
little opposition within Britain. The third type of group affected by political jiu-jitsu is the resistance 
movement itself. An example is the massacre of hundreds of peaceful protesters on 9 January 1905 
by the government of Russia, which undermined popular support for the Tsar and greatly increased 
support for revolutionaries. Many more examples of political jiu-jitsu could be cited from a variety 
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of contexts, such as the bombing of Greenpeace’s vessel Rainbow Warrior by French secret agents, 
an act that mobilised tremendous sympathy and support for Greenpeace. 
However, one aspect of political jiu-jitsu is undeveloped in Sharp’s analysis: the presence of a 
sympathetic audience. In order to generate ‘shifts in opinion’ and ‘shifts in power relationships’, the 
nonviolent action and repression must be visible to an audience that is potentially swayed to support 
the resisters. We will find, in examining cases in the history of Indonesian repression, getting 
information to a sympathetic audience makes an enormous difference to the effectiveness of political 
jiu-jitsu. 
In this paper we find evidence that the key dynamic of political jiu-jitsu is just as crucial -- by its 
absence -- in lower profile and less successful nonviolent resistance as it is by its presence in higher 
profile and more successful nonviolent action. If this is so, it suggests that a vast number of struggles 
-- namely the lower profile ones that normally receive much less attention than prominent and 
successful struggles -- can serve as fruitful areas for investigation of the dynamics of nonviolent 
action. 
  
The Toppling of Suharto[16] 
Indonesia became a Dutch colony through a long period of expansion beginning in 1619 and ending 
in the 1920s. After occupation by the Japanese during World War II, nationalist leaders declared 
independence in 1945 and after a national revolution gained sovereignty in 1949. Over the period 
1965-1967, the left-leaning Sukarno government was replaced by a military-dominated regime led 
by Suharto, accompanied by a major bloodbath, as described in the next section. 
The foundation of the Suharto regime’s power was the military forces, but with a democratic facade. 
Within this framework, Suharto maintained power through astute political manoeuvring.[17] He 
sidelined challengers, rewarded friends (especially family members) and repressed dissent. 
Repression was systematic: all potential opponents, both popular and in the elite, including the 
military, were crushed. All organisations that might provide a basis for questioning or challenging 
the regime, such as political parties, trade unions and cultural bodies, were banned, restrained or 
brought into the state mechanism, a process called ‘depoliticisation.’ 
As a method to prevent challenges to the regime, repression was supplemented by cooption. The 
most effective form of cooption was through economic growth, which proceeded at an impressive 
7% annually from 1970. During this time the regime was supported by Western governments and the 
major international funding agencies and praised for its economic policies.[18] 
With the announcement of a period of ‘openness’ in the late 1980s, voices of dissent began to 
emerge, but no one inside or outside the country believed that Suharto’s grip on power was 
weakening. Into the mid 1990s, popular opposition was muted, partially as a result of continued 
economic growth. Opposition political parties were banned or severely constrained, serving only as 
fig-leaves for a pretend democracy. The regime and its policies were feted by Western governments. 
The Indonesian military retained ultimate power and received weapons and training from various 
governments such as Australia and the US. 
This suddenly changed as a result of economic collapse, triggered by the crash in Thailand beginning 
in 1997 which spread to several southeast Asian economies. Indonesia was particularly hard hit, with 
the collapse of the rupiah leading to widespread impoverishment, more extreme than in other 
countries.[19] Prior to the collapse, Indonesia’s economic policies had been fully supported by the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and most commentators, but afterwards blame was 
placed either on corruption and cronyism or on global markets.
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The dramatic change in economic climate opened the doors for a deeper expression of popular 
opposition. Outrage over corruption, collusion and cronyism became a rallying cry, with the 
government blamed for economic misfortunes. The regime was not well structured to deal with this 
new situation. Suharto had become increasingly out of touch with everyday realities since he was 
surrounded with sycophants, operated using a 1960s way of thinking (including a Cold-War fear of 
communism) and was tied into the crony system he had used to build his power. As a result, his 
political judgement suffered. In addition, his health was poor, so both physically and mentally he 
was not ready for the unprecedented challenges he faced in 1998.[20] 
The economic crisis had the most severe impact on the urban working class and the unemployed, but 
these groups did not take much action, being preoccupied with pure survival. The overt opposition 
was drawn primarily from the middle classes, including students, academics, university graduates, 
journalists, lawyers, artists and NGO staff. This middle-class group, having grown up in a time of 
prosperity, was particularly affected by the sharp changes in lifestyle brought about by the crisis. Of 
those involved, students were by far the most vocal. 
Before 1997, NGO leaders and former student activists had tried to create a coalition in opposition to 
the regime, but had not got very far: Suharto’s methods of depoliticisation were too effective.[21] 
The collapse of the economy served as a catalyst and a rallying point for a more solidified and 
organised opposition. 
Students began to openly challenge the government by holding rallies on campus and then moving 
off campus in defiance of conditions imposed by the police. As the rallies became larger, more 
students joined in and leaders became bolder. Meanwhile, opposition activity blossomed in a range 
of areas, such as the arts scene. On 12 May 1998, four students and two others in the crowd were 
killed by troops at Trisakti University, an elite private institution in Jakarta. This event triggered 
massive rioting and looting in Jakarta, causing extensive damage and leaving more than a thousand 
people dead (principally looters caught in fires). This event caused a loss of public faith in the 
regime and led some military elites to think that Suharto should resign in order to placate the 
population.[22] 
Thus, violence by the regime triggered much greater support for the resistance, an example of 
political jiu-jitsu. Massive rallies were held throughout the country. In Jakarta, students continued to 
lead protests, which involved ever larger sectors of the population. This unprecedented public 
display of opposition caused splits within the ruling elite. 
Not long before these events, Suharto had promoted his son-in-law Subianto Prabowo to head the 
Kopassus special force. A ruthless operator, Prabowo had ambitions to gain power over the head of 
the armed forces, General Wiranto, who was also close to Suharto. Earlier in 1998, various activists 
‘disappeared,’ some of them emerging weeks or months later after imprisonment and torture in 
secret locations. Others were presumed to have been murdered; their relatives still do not know their 
fate. This repressive operation was probably orchestrated by Prabowo. He sought to stop student 
protests by force and was responsible for the killing of students on 12 May, which may have been 
done purposely by military units rather than accidentally in general shooting.[23] Since this 
repressive approach was triggering ever more massive popular opposition, some members of the elite 
decided Suharto had to go.[24] 
A student occupation of parliament was crucial. This occupation reached its climax on 20 May and 
was a key factor in convincing members of cabinet that Suharto had to resign. As the protest 
expanded, opposition political leaders joined in. Amien Rais, a leading Islamic political figure, 
called a rally for 20 May. In order to stop it, Indonesian troops shut down central Jakarta. This in 
turn alienated the business sector, supplying yet more pressure for change. The end was near when 
the leader of the parliament -- all of whose members were virtually handpicked by Suharto -- called 
for Suharto to step down. On 21 May Suharto suddenly announced his resignation and his deputy, B. 
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J. Habibie, took over. The surprise resignation reduced the chance of a broader democratisation at 
that time. 
The Indonesian events fit a standard pattern of political jiu-jitsu, in which open defiance of the 
regime generates greater support. If the regime does nothing, then opponents become bolder in their 
actions. If the regime responds with overt violence, this causes public outrage and greater support for 
the opposition, though this is not a guarantee of success. It only remains to note a few points of 
special interest in this case. 
One of the standard methods used by the regime to maintain control was to infiltrate potential 
opposition groups and to foster dissension, such as by accentuating religious and ethnic divisions. 
Eventually, students attempted to overcome this by instituting tight internal discipline, to the extent 
of allowing only students to take part in student-organised occupations, in order to prevent 
infiltration and to maintain focus on a single goal: to get rid of Suharto. 
The tactics used by one key student group, Forum Kota (City Forum) illustrate one method of 
avoiding cooption. Every week this student group changed both its leader and its command post so 
that no one leader or campus could gain control and be open to cooption.[25] Although the military 
did try, as usual, to infiltrate the student groups, this proved unsuccessful. One student said 
laughingly of those who attempted to infiltrate ‘They always have short hair and they are in good 
physical condition. You can spot them a mile away.’[26] 
Communication was crucial in coordinating resistance and alerting people to what was occurring. 
Electronic mail and the web were effective tools for the opposition, since they by-passed censorship 
of the mass media and were low cost.[27] The editor of the Jakarta Post noted that the protests 
allowed his newspaper to cover issues that were otherwise strictly forbidden.[28] For their part, 
members of the Alliance of Independent Journalists gave the students crash courses in how to 
publish newsletters and convey their ideas.[29] 
Open use of violence by the regime, especially the killing of students at an elite university, turned 
out to be very counterproductive: this was a prime example of political jiu-jitsu in action. In 
comparison, the ‘disappearances’ earlier in the year caused far less outrage. The main difference was 
that it was harder to assign responsibility for covert torture and killing. Similarly, the regime 
attempted to distance itself from responsibility by using agents provocateurs, paid demonstrators, 
gangs and criminals to undertake looting, arson and rape, including attacks on the Chinese minority, 
designed to aggravate ethnic tensions and reduce the chance of unified opposition to the regime.[30] 
In these cases, the regime attempted to nullify political jiu-jitsu by obscuring its role in violence. 
Throughout the events, foreign governments played little overt role and certainly did little to help the 
opposition. Public events were reported to the world but the outcome was mainly determined by 
internal dynamics, especially in Jakarta. However, reports of actions on the web and CNN helped the 
students to maintain their momentum. 
  
The 1965-1966 Massacres[31] 
President Sukarno, leader of the government that came to power following Indonesian independence 
in 1949, rose to prominence on an anti-colonial platform. He sponsored the development of an 
alternative ‘Third World’ through the 1955 Bandung conference and was quick to invoke anti-
foreign feeling when faced with what he perceived to be continuing colonialist tendencies of large 
Western states. He showed himself willing to court the Soviet and Chinese governments if it suited 
him to do business with them rather than the West. The US government[32] felt that the Sukarno 
government could not be relied upon in a region it considered to be of utmost strategic importance 
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and was desperate for a more staunchly anti-communist regime to rule in the archipelago. 
The opportunity for change came in 1965 following an attempted coup.[33] The incident deeply 
tarnished Sukarno’s reputation and heralded a power shift towards the military. Along with his 
military supporters, General Suharto, the Commander of the Jakarta garrison that defeated the coup, 
took the opportunity to massacre those who were known, thought or rumoured to be members of the 
Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) or their sympathisers and many more as well. Using a well 
orchestrated media campaign, Suharto banned the PKI and escalated his programme of slaughtering 
communists and suspects. The army systematically went about the obliteration of those deemed 
politically undesirable in Central Java, moving east through to Bali. As well as killing suspected 
Communists themselves, army officers gave lists of names to right-wing Muslim groups and other 
anti-communist militias who were provided with arms and transport for the purposes of carrying out 
this pogrom. The CIA was firmly behind Suharto’s actions, supplying lists of leading communists 
who had infiltrated various government and military bodies.[34] Although most of the deaths 
occurred in 1965 and 1966, the slaughter continued until 1969 when virtually all apparent opposition 
had been eliminated. 
Against this wave of killings, left-wing opponents were quickly rendered few and disorganised. 
Power shifted further to Suharto in March 1966 when the army insisted that Sukarno delegate 
extensive powers to Suharto, at the time Chief of Staff of the Army, and then officially in 1968 when 
Suharto was appointed to the presidency in his own right. By then he had set up the conditions for 
comfortable rule with the bulk of his opponents killed or imprisoned. It is commonly estimated that 
500,000 to one million died in his army's anti-communist rampages, making this one of the century’s 
major bloodbaths.[35] At least 400,000 were imprisoned, many on the remote island of Buru. 
While many Indonesians struggled against the repressive Suharto power grab, they did so at 
enormous cost. Many chose not to act because the risks were too great: even the slightest resistance 
was dangerous and could mean the death of oneself or one’s family. Overt resistance would have 
required not only extraordinary courage but, to be effective, high and efficient levels of organisation 
would have had to be developed for the new circumstances which prevailed. This would have been a 
daunting challenge given the number of activists being killed. However, examples of individual 
bravery exist. For example, the then head of Denpasar Hospital, Dr Djelantik, at great personal risk 
refused killing squads access to his patients.[36] 
Early stages of the dynamics of nonviolent action include laying the groundwork, challenging the 
opponent and maintaining solidarity and discipline to oppose the resulting repression. In the 
circumstances of the massacres, these stages were undeveloped to say the least. Nevertheless, the 
process of political jiu-jitsu could have still operated if the massacres had generated opposition to the 
regime, either among those potentially targeted, in Suharto’s camp or among third parties. Within 
Indonesia, due to lack of preparation and the disarray caused by the massacres, resistance was 
limited. However, this need not have applied to third parties. In particular, the massacres could have 
led to international action either by governments or by nongovernment groups. 
As hundreds or thousands were killed every day, Western governments had good information about 
what was happening. Documents from the period show that Australian and US governments knew 
about the massacres as they were occurring, yet did nothing to stop them, instead welcoming the 
elimination of the communist threat.[37] Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt was obviously 
pleased with the situation in Indonesia when he announced in 1966 that ‘with 500,000 to 1,000,000 
Communist sympathizers knocked off, I think it is safe to assume a reorientation has taken 
place.’[38] 
There was no groundswell of international public opinion that might have forced governments to 
adopt a different approach. Perhaps the strongest barrier to more widespread mobilisation was the 
Cold War paradigm within which many people understood the global order. The beneficiaries of this 
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ideology were arms manufacturers and those who sought to invest in repressive regimes such as 
Indonesia which, if nothing else, seemed politically stable as well as obviously friendly to foreign 
investment. 
However, many people in these Western countries did not perceive the situation in this economic 
light, nor did they understand the relevance of these economic arrangements. Many simply perceived 
the world situation as one of danger with the overwhelming need being to hold communism at bay. 
There was widespread paranoia about the march of communism, widely supported by government 
propaganda that took advantage of much of the pain and loss from the previous world war. 
Belief in the so-called domino effect promoted fear that the march south of communism was almost 
inevitable except by means of the utmost vigilance, enormous expenditure on arms and inclusion 
within a nuclear umbrella. With communism having established itself in Eastern Europe and having 
‘spread’ from the Soviet Union to China and Korea, it was a common belief that Indonesia and then 
Australia (probably by invasion) were next in line. Crude though this was, it held much sway in a 
fiercely paranoid and anti-communist climate, used by Western governments to control domestic 
situations as well as to guide foreign policy. During the 1960s and 1970s, the most visible 
manifestation of the anti-communist impulse was the war in Vietnam. 
The media’s commitment to anti-communism meant that the government line went largely 
unchallenged. For their part, opposition political parties usually spent more time supporting the 
ideology and trying to distance themselves as much as possible from any socialist taint than trying to 
challenge Cold War assumptions. The barrier of anti-communist ideology proved too large, in the 
case of the 1965-1966 massacres, to have sufficient pressures mounted on governments to take 
strong stands against the Indonesian government’s brutality and repression. 
Thus, the massacres proceeded without much resulting backlash. Within Indonesia, this can be 
explained by the lack of preparation for resistance and lack of an organised movement to build on 
outrage caused by the killings. Outside Indonesia, the massacres received relatively little attention, 
with anti-communism providing a framework for justifying what was happening. This has been 
called a case of ‘constructive terror’, namely mass killing that fostered a favourable investment 
climate.[39] In terms of nonviolence theory, political jiu-jitsu was rendered ineffective because there 
was no sympathetic audience that could be readily mobilised as a result of the killings. 
  
East Timor[40] 
East Timor became a Portuguese colony in the 1500s. Prior to that it had been a series of small 
kingdoms. East Timor remained Portuguese until 1975, shortly after the Caetano regime in Lisbon 
was overthrown by a coup, bringing about a policy change towards decolonisation. In response 
several political parties formed in East Timor with views about what sort of future the territory 
should have. Fretilin was the party that went on to gather most popular support and that was 
paramount in the struggle for independence. 
Following the Lisbon coup, the Portuguese stayed in East Timor until one of the East Timorese 
parties, the Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT) staged a small and unsuccessful coup that was 
fairly easily put down. At that stage the Portuguese retreated to the island of Atauro, thus leaving a 
temporary vacuum, of which the Indonesian government was keen to take advantage despite Fretilin 
declaring independence for the Democratic Republic of East Timor in November 1975. Both the 
Indonesian and Australian governments promoted the view that Fretilin was Marxist. 
Indonesian forces invaded in December. As well as military operations, they engaged in massive 
killing of civilians, rape, torture and destruction. Fretilin was the target of much of the slaughter, 
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although the group held its own initially, having its major strongholds in the mountains and being in 
possession of a substantial number of arms that the Portuguese had left behind. However the 
Indonesian military slaughter of East Timorese people was so great that it decimated Fretilin forces 
as part of its overall culling. Fretilin later made a resurgence in small and then greater numbers.[41] 
The Indonesian military assault against East Timor left the small territory devastated. Some 
estimates claim that up to one-third of the population died. Agricultural output fell by almost 70 
percent in just three years, causing serious famine. Infant mortality was elevated to among the 
highest in the world, nearly all East Timorese teachers were executed and 400 schools destroyed.[42]
The Indonesian invasion was largely undertaken with the condonation of Western governments, if 
not their blessing.[43] The Australian and US governments provided quiet succour, hinting only that 
they did not wish to be seen as openly supporting or condoning any such invasion. Suharto obliged 
by forestalling a full-scale invasion until President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger had completed a visit they were making to Jakarta.[44] 
In Australia, both Liberal and Labor governments adopted the same policies toward Indonesia. 
Liberal Prime Minister John Gorton visited Indonesia during his term (1968-1971) and Liberal Prime 
Minister William McMahon (1971-1972) received Suharto as his guest in Australia in 1972. In 1968, 
immediately after becoming leader of the Australian Labor Party (then in opposition), Gough 
Whitlam advocated a friendly and supportive approach to the Suharto regime which he suggested 
was preferable to a communist government which he felt had nearly been in command there.[45] 
Richard Walsh and George Munster claim that Whitlam had an image of Indonesia that had little to 
do with reality but more to do with his desire for good relations. Wanting to be sophisticated, 
cultured and contemptuous of the White Australia Policy which had tarnished Australia’s reputation 
in Asia, Whitlam was keen for a new and close relationship with the neighbour to the north but this 
meant believing the regime to be more innocuous and somewhat different than it was.[46] As 
Australian prime minister in September 1975, Whitlam announced that an independent East Timor 
was not viable, a statement that Suharto would have interpreted as a justification for an invasion. 
The Indonesian invasion of East Timor just three months later was in contradiction of the Indonesian 
government’s own prior claim that it had no interest in the territory. Yet the assault should not have 
been surprising, for intelligence reports available to both Australian and US agencies in 1975 
indicated that invasion was precisely the Indonesia government’s intention. In 1974, East Timorese 
spokesperson Jose Ramos Horta had visited Australia, trying to alert the government and any 
interested groups of the Indonesian military’s aggressive intent. Though his warning was received 
sympathetically by non-government groups, the Australian government paid it no heed. 
East Timor solidarity campaigns were started around the world. Activists struggled long and hard to 
stop the bloodshed and pursued various campaigns such as against Western arms sales to Indonesia.
[47] Symbolic actions were used in an attempt to alert other citizens to the situation in East Timor 
and to take a stand against Western governments’ military involvement. In an attempt to ‘disturb 
consciences,’ one British activist conducted a peaceful raid on British Aerospace where he hung a 
banner, painted slogans and hammered the machines of destruction. Conducting his own defence at 
his resulting trial, he focussed on Britain’s supply of this weaponry to Indonesia and its role in the 
repression of East Timorese.[48] Some time later four women undertook a similar raid of a British 
Aerospace plant, attacking with household hammers a Hawk fighter aircraft destined for Indonesia 
the following day and leaving in the pilot’s seat a videotaped explanation of their actions.[49] 
In Australia the Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET) was established in November 
1974.[50] Campaign activists in CIET issued press releases warning of the threat of invasion, 
contacted members of parliament, met with Fretilin activists, sought trade union actions, organised 
demonstrations, gathered information, put out fortnightly bulletins, fed information to the media, 
arranged interviews between Australian media and Fretilin spokespeople and encouraged formation 
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of East Timor solidarity groups in other countries. Perhaps one of the group’s biggest contributions 
was helping set up secret radio contact in Darwin with Fretilin in East Timor and providing operators 
and technical support. Several times Australian security police tracked down and seized the 
transmitter.[51] 
According to Denis Freney of CIET, ‘… despite the best efforts of many people around the country 
[Australia] to get the government to stop supporting Suharto we had little success, although we were 
able to keep the question alive even while most people thought it a "lost cause".’[52] 
There are several reasons why political jiu-jitsu did not operate effectively in East Timor in the years 
immediately following the invasion. First, the resistance was not entirely nonviolent. There was 
nonviolent resistance, to be sure, but this was overshadowed by the guerrilla struggle waged by 
Fretilin. Arguably, much greater support could have been generated, especially internationally, by an 
entirely nonviolent resistance. In the 1980s, the East Timorese resistance reorganised to gain more 
support, with the aim of building unity in East Timor and gaining support in Indonesia and 
internationally. The new emphasis was on nonviolent action, urban participation and orientation of 
guerrillas to defending against attacks and not initiating violence. This resulted in a much more 
potent resistance movement.[53] 
Another obstacle to triggering political jiu-jitsu was lack of information about massacres for 
international audiences. The Indonesian occupiers did everything possible to shut down 
communication outside the country. The importance of communication to outside audiences can be 
illustrated by a couple of examples. In 1989, the Indonesian government ‘opened’ East Timor to 
outside contact. In November 1991 a slaughter of more than 200 peaceful protesters at the Santa 
Cruz cemetary in Dili, the capital of East Timor,[54] was recorded on videotape by a Western 
journalist with the pseudonym Max Stahl, who was able to smuggle it out of the country. When this 
footage reached an international television audience, it caused outrage and triggered a great increase 
in Western popular support for the East Timorese struggle[55] -- a classic example of political jiu-
jitsu. 
Eventually public sentiment abroad turned against the Indonesian regime, largely as a result of 
getting more information about events in East Timor than governments were willing to disseminate 
through formal channels. Following the UN-supervised vote in East Timor in September 1999, in 
which nearly 80% of voters supported independence, the Indonesian military in East Timor connived 
with anti-independence militias in a ruthless orgy of killing and forced relocation. Because much of 
this occurred in the full spotlight of the world media (at least for those countries where East Timor is 
considered significant, especially Australia), large numbers of people outside Indonesia were 
horrified and outraged, leading to many forms of nonviolent action including trade union bans and 
discouragement of tourism. 
Note that in both the 1991 Dili massacre and the 1999 post-vote violence, the East Timorese 
resistance had by that stage adopted a largely nonviolent approach, Indonesian repression was 
exercised against nonviolent civilians and information was available to an international audience. 
Thus, conditions were more conducive to political jiu-jitsu than in the decade from 1975. Of course, 
other factors played a role, including the saliency of anti-communism, the strength of international 
human rights and solidarity groups and the interest of the mass media. 
  
Conclusion 
The protests in Indonesia in 1998 that led to the resignation of President Suharto fit the standard 
pattern of nonviolent action, in which conspicuous protests encourage more people to participate and 
open repression against protesters causes a backlash against the regime. Studying these events using 
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nonviolence theory can be a fruitful exercise, but our aim here is instead to draw attention to the 
value of studying events where nonviolent action was less prominent or less effective. In the case of 
the repressive Suharto regime, the 1965-1966 massacres and the 1975 invasion and occupation of 
East Timor offer opportunities for probing the dynamics of nonviolent action. 
Studying prominent action no doubt will remain the centrepiece of the study of nonviolent action, 
but this needs to be supplemented by much more attention to periods and occasions where there are 
relatively low levels of action and to examining the key factors that, if somehow developed, could 
make a difference. The 1998 protests in Indonesia show what sort of people’s action was possible, 
and throw into relief the relative lack of such effective opposition at other times. Likewise, the 1999 
protests in Australia against killing in East Timor show what sort of people’s action was possible 
outside of Indonesia, and throw into relief the relative lack of this sort of effective opposition at other 
times, notably during the 1965-1966 massacres and during and immediately after the 1975 invasion 
of East Timor. 
In examining nonviolent action against Indonesian repression, we have focussed on political jiu-jitsu. 
In the toppling of Suharto, this occurred most obviously following the killing of students at Trisakti 
University by Indonesian troops, an act that triggered much greater opposition. But this powerful 
effect probably would not have occurred but for a range of preconditions: the student protest itself, 
earlier protests leading up to it, the prior preparation by activists and their development of nonviolent 
discipline, the wider mobilisation of opposition in Indonesia and the economic and political factors 
that encouraged open expression of dissent. The entire process appears like a model case study in the 
dynamics of nonviolent action, although the resignation of Suharto inhibited a wider social 
transformation. It is worth noting that actors outside Indonesia did not play a large role in the 
process. 
In the 1965-1966 massacres, political jiu-jitsu was not effectively mobilised to halt the killings. 
There was insufficient preparation for resistance inside Indonesia and insufficient organisation to 
build on the resistance that did occur. Outside Indonesia, governments and populations were not 
triggered into action by the massacres. 
In the 1975 invasion of East Timor, political jiu-jitsu was not effectively mobilised because the 
guerrilla resistance overshadowed the role of nonviolent action. Furthermore, communication outside 
the country was limited, reducing prospects for international mobilisation of resistance. 
Both the 1965-1966 massacres and the case of East Timor point to an important factor in the 
effectiveness of political jiu-jitsu: the presence of a potentially sympathetic audience with access to 
information. In particular, third party audiences need to know about what is happening and be 
potentially concerned. In the case of the 1965-1966 massacres, reporting was limited and the 
dominant anti-communist mind-set limited concern. In the case of East Timor, communication out of 
the country was limited and governments were not inclined to be concerned. 
When examining nonviolent action, there are many other aspects that are worthy of examination, 
such as the role of divisions among elite groups[56] or the availability of communication technology.
[57] Our aim here, though, is less to point to particular factors in the success or failure of nonviolent 
action, but rather to show that examining cases where nonviolent action has a low profile or is not 
very effective has the potential for providing insights about nonviolent action. In both a case where 
nonviolent action was high profile and effective and in two cases where it was low profile and much 
less effective, we find that the effective triggering of political jiu-jitsu is crucial to success and a 
failure to trigger political jiu-jitsu helps explain lack of success. More specifically, in the toppling of 
Suharto, political jiu-jitsu was a key to success of nonviolent action, whereas in the 1965-1966 
massacres and East Timor from 1975, lack of success can be attributed, in part, to a failure to trigger 
political jiu-jitsu. 
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It is precisely because the standard conclusion -- that political jiu-jitsu is a key factor in the success 
of nonviolent action -- can be reached via the cases of low-profile resistance that shows that insights 
about the dynamics of nonviolent action can be obtained from these sorts of cases. Note that while 
studying high-profile, successful cases provides insight into what makes nonviolent action 
successful, studying lower-profile, relatively unsuccessful cases is more likely to provide insight into 
what prevents or inhibits success of nonviolent action. While these two types of insight are closely 
linked, they are not identical. Specifically, we found that studying less successful cases highlighted 
the importance of nonviolent action and repression being visible to potentially sympathetic 
audiences, a point that can easily be missed when nonviolent action has a higher profile and thus 
communication is less problematic. 
There are enormous numbers of cases of lower profile nonviolent resistance available for study, 
offering a wealth of material for learning that has largely been untapped. In the case of Indonesia, 
examples of lower profile or less-than-fully-effective nonviolent action include movements for 
autonomy or independence in West Irian, Aceh and other provinces, workers’ struggles against 
exploitative employers (national and transnational), efforts to resist religious oppression and 
indigenous people’s struggles against development projects. While it is impossible to specify in 
advance what precisely can be learned by studying such cases, possibilities include factors in 
effective preparation for struggle, barriers to building nonviolent discipline, the ways violence 
inhibits the effectiveness of political jiu-jitsu, and strategies by oppressors to counter nonviolent 
mobilisation. There may be less inspiration in studying cases when resistance appears unsuccessful, 
but the possibility of additional insights makes the effort worthwhile. 
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